

intrinsic semantics of termination-insensitive noninterference

by Jonathan Sterling (j.w.w. Robert Harper)

on April 26, 2022

Boston University POPV Seminar

“type structure is a syntactic discipline for enforcing levels of abstraction.” (Reynolds, 1983)

“type structure is a syntactic discipline for enforcing levels of abstraction.” (Reynolds, 1983)

my take: a type system is a *protocol* for the flow of information between different levels of abstraction.

» the diversity of abstraction barriers

types are used to implement **many** forms of abstraction.

- * implementation *vs.* interface.
- * compiletime *vs.* runtime
- * public *vs.* private
- * trusted *vs.* untrusted

this talk: type for abstraction barriers with *security* as a running example

» noninterference measures abstraction

it is easy to make a fancy type system; *but how do we know that it actually enforces a given abstraction?*

» noninterference measures abstraction

it is easy to make a fancy type system; *but how do we know that it actually enforces a given abstraction?*

Goguen and Meseguer (1982) suggested **noninterference** as an objective measure of abstraction.

» noninterference measures abstraction

it is easy to make a fancy type system; *but how do we know that it actually enforces a given abstraction?*

Goguen and Meseguer (1982) suggested **noninterference** as an objective measure of abstraction.

1. any module functor $[\text{type } t] \rightarrow [\text{val } b : \text{bool}]$ is constant
Harper et al. (1990); Sterling and Harper (2021a)
2. any function $\tau @ \text{private} \rightarrow \text{bool} @ \text{public}$ is constant
Abadi et al. (1999); Sterling and Harper (2022)

[in this talk, “constant” means “ $fx = fy$ for all x, y ”.]

» noninterference measures abstraction

it is easy to make a fancy type system; *but how do we know that it actually enforces a given abstraction?*

Goguen and Meseguer (1982) suggested **noninterference** as an objective measure of abstraction.

1. any module functor $[\mathbf{type\ t}] \rightarrow [\mathbf{val\ b : bool}]$ is constant
Harper et al. (1990); Sterling and Harper (2021a)
2. any function $\tau @ \mathbf{private} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool} @ \mathbf{public}$ is constant
Abadi et al. (1999); Sterling and Harper (2022)

[in this talk, “constant” means “ $f x = f y$ for all x, y ”.]

in other words, **noninterference** states that abstracted data is not leaked. (often a consequence of parametricity, but do not confuse the map for the territory!)

» the need for controlled leakage of abstraction

full **noninterference** represents an *extreme* abstraction policy that is useful in many cases.

» the need for controlled leakage of abstraction

full **noninterference** represents an *extreme* abstraction policy that is useful in many cases.

in practice, we often need *weaker abstraction policies* that allow certain sensitive data to be leaked in a controlled way.

» the need for controlled leakage of abstraction

full **noninterference** represents an *extreme* abstraction policy that is useful in many cases.

in practice, we often need *weaker abstraction policies* that allow certain sensitive data to be leaked in a controlled way.

- * inlining definitions across module boundaries (MLton)

» the need for controlled leakage of abstraction

full **noninterference** represents an *extreme* abstraction policy that is useful in many cases.

in practice, we often need *weaker abstraction policies* that allow certain sensitive data to be leaked in a controlled way.

- * inlining definitions across module boundaries (MLton)
- * revealing secret votes after the auction is finished

» the need for controlled leakage of abstraction

full **noninterference** represents an *extreme* abstraction policy that is useful in many cases.

in practice, we often need *weaker abstraction policies* that allow certain sensitive data to be leaked in a controlled way.

- * inlining definitions across module boundaries (MLton)
- * revealing secret votes after the auction is finished
- * **this talk:** leaking through the termination channel, *i.e.* **termination-insensitive noninterference / TINI**

» partial functions and termination-insensitive noninterference

full noninterference says that for any partial function $f : \text{int} @ \text{private} \rightarrow \text{bool} @ \text{public}$, either

1. $f = \lambda_.\text{ret tt}$,
2. or $f = \lambda_.\text{ret ff}$,
3. or $f = \lambda_.\perp$.

termination-insensitive noninterference says that for any $x, y : \text{int} @ \text{private}$ such that $fx \downarrow$ and $fy \downarrow$, we have $fx = fy$.

TINI: leak data through (only) the termination channel

contribution of this work:
new denotational semantics for TINI

dependency core calculus

» a core calculus of dependency (Abadi et al., 1999)

Abadi et al. (1999) proposed a simple and elegant core calculus **DCC** for information flow; monadic metalanguage + idempotent monads for each security level:

$$A ::= A \rightarrow B \mid A \times B \mid A_{\perp} \mid T_l A$$

judgment $A \text{ sealed } @ l$ means that $\eta : A \rightarrow T_l A$ is an iso.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : T_l A \quad \Gamma, x : A \vdash Nx : B \quad B \text{ sealed } @ l}{\Gamma \vdash x \leftarrow M; Nx : B}$$

» closure properties of sealing in DCC

antitone family of exponential ideals:

$$\frac{l \sqsubseteq l'}{\top_{l'} A \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

$$\frac{A \text{ sealed } @ l}{\top_{l'} A \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

$$\frac{A \text{ sealed } @ l \quad B \text{ sealed } @ l}{A \times B \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

$$\frac{B \text{ sealed } @ l}{A \rightarrow B \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

» noninterference in DCC

noninterference holds in DCC because you can't "get out" of the monad T_l . but how do we prove it?

1. construct a **denotational semantics** $\llbracket - \rrbracket$ that validates noninterference
2. prove that DCC is **computationally adequate** wrt. $\llbracket - \rrbracket$, *i.e.* for $\cdot \vdash M : \mathbf{unit}_\perp$ we have:

$$\llbracket M \rrbracket \downarrow \iff (\cdot \vdash M = \mathbf{ret} () : \mathbf{unit}_\perp)$$

Abadi et al. (1999) employ a *relational model* over dcpos.

» Abadi et al.'s relational model of DCC

dcpos model the “Moggi fragment” $A \times B, A \rightarrow B, A_{\perp}$.

» Abadi et al.'s relational model of DCC

dcpos model the “Moggi fragment” $A \times B, A \rightarrow B, A_{\perp}$.
more structure needed to interpret **sealing**.

» Abadi et al.'s relational model of DCC

dcpos model the “Moggi fragment” $A \times B, A \rightarrow B, A_{\perp}$.
more structure needed to interpret **sealing**.

Abadi et al.: constrain dcpos by $|\mathcal{L}|$ -indexed *binary relations*, where $(\mathcal{L}, \sqsubseteq)$ is the poset of security levels.

» indexed logical relation on dcpos

Abadi et al. (1999) define an indexed logical relation \mathcal{DC} :

- * an **object** is a pair of a dcpo A and a family of admissible binary relation $R_{A,l} \subseteq A \times A$ for $l \in \mathcal{L}$;
- * a **morphism** from (A, R_A) to (B, R_B) is a continuous function $f : A \rightarrow B$ such that for all $(x, y) \in R_{A,l}$ we have $(fx, fy) \in R_{B,l}$.

\mathcal{DC} is cartesian closed; in fact, it is the **admissible sub-gluing** of the functor $\text{dcpo} \rightarrow \text{dcpo}^{|\mathcal{L}|}$ sending A to $(l \mapsto A \times A)$ where $|\mathcal{L}|$ is the underlying set of the poset \mathcal{L} .

» relational interpretation of nontermination and sealing

Abadi et al. interpret a type as a pair $\llbracket A \rrbracket = (|A|, R_A) \in \mathcal{DC}$.

nontermination:

$$\begin{aligned} |A_{\perp}| &= |A|_{\perp} \\ R_{A_{\perp}, l} &= R_{A, l} \cup \{(\perp, \perp)\} \end{aligned}$$

sealing:

$$\begin{aligned} |\top_l A| &= |A| \\ R_{\top_l A, l'} &= \begin{cases} R_{A, l'} & \text{if } l \sqsubseteq l' \\ \top & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

» noninterference via relational model

fix a function $f : T_{\text{private}} \text{int} \rightarrow (T_{\text{public}} \text{bool})_{\perp}$.

» noninterference via relational model

fix a function $f : T_{\text{private}} \text{int} \rightarrow (T_{\text{public}} \text{bool})_{\perp}$.

$\llbracket f \rrbracket$ is a function $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow 2_{\perp}$ such that for all $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$x R_{T_{\text{private}} \text{int}, l} y \implies \llbracket f \rrbracket x = \llbracket f \rrbracket y$$

» noninterference via relational model

fix a function $f : \mathbb{T}_{\text{private}} \text{int} \rightarrow (\mathbb{T}_{\text{public}} \text{bool})_{\perp}$.

$\llbracket f \rrbracket$ is a function $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow 2_{\perp}$ such that for all $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$x R_{\mathbb{T}_{\text{private}} \text{int}, l} y \implies \llbracket f \rrbracket x = \llbracket f \rrbracket y$$

setting $l := \text{public}$, we have:

$$\top \implies \llbracket f \rrbracket x = \llbracket f \rrbracket y$$

» noninterference via relational model

fix a function $f : T_{\text{private}} \text{int} \rightarrow (T_{\text{public}} \text{bool})_{\perp}$.

$\llbracket f \rrbracket$ is a function $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow 2_{\perp}$ such that for all $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$x R_{T_{\text{private}} \text{int}, l} y \implies \llbracket f \rrbracket x = \llbracket f \rrbracket y$$

setting $l := \text{public}$, we have:

$$\top \implies \llbracket f \rrbracket x = \llbracket f \rrbracket y$$

thus the relational model satisfies noninterference.
adequacy for the relational model then implies
noninterference for DCC.

» noninterference and discreteness

noninterference always works in the same way: you have a **more indiscrete** relation on the left and a **more discrete** relation on the right.

» noninterference and discreteness

noninterference always works in the same way: you have a **more indiscrete** relation on the left and a **more discrete** relation on the right.

noninterference is **termination-sensitive** in the relational model $\llbracket - \rrbracket$ because when R_A is discrete, then so is R_{A_\perp} .

» noninterference and discreteness

noninterference always works in the same way: you have a **more indiscrete** relation on the left and a **more discrete** relation on the right.

noninterference is **termination-sensitive** in the relational model $\llbracket - \rrbracket$ because when R_A is discrete, then so is R_{A_\perp} .

Abadi et al. (1999) go on to adapt the DCC to support **termination-insensitivity** by changing the semantics of A_\perp to be less discrete.

» adapting DCC for termination-insensitive noninterference

Abadi et al. (1999) adapt DCC for TINI by extending the rules for sealing:

$$\frac{A \text{ sealed } @ l}{A_{\perp} \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

with this rule, the canonical map $(T_l A)_{\perp} \rightarrow T_l A_{\perp}$ is an iso.

» adapting DCC for termination-insensitive noninterference

Abadi et al. (1999) adapt DCC for TINI by extending the rules for sealing:

$$\frac{A \text{ sealed } @ l}{A_{\perp} \text{ sealed } @ l}$$

with this rule, the canonical map $(T_l A)_{\perp} \rightarrow T_l A_{\perp}$ is an iso.

lastly, tweak the relational semantics:

$$R_{A_{\perp}, l} = R_{A, l} \cup \{(\perp, \perp)\} \cup \{(x, \perp) \mid x \in |A|\} \cup \{(\perp, x) \mid x \in |A|\}$$

» critique of relational semantics of TINI

there are several problems with the relational semantics.
refer to $A \in \mathcal{DC}$ as *l-sealed* when $A \cong T_l A$.

» critique of relational semantics of TINI

there are several problems with the relational semantics.
refer to $A \in \mathcal{DC}$ as *l-sealed* when $A \cong T_l A$.

1. **failure of antitonicity:** if A is l -sealed and $k \sqsubseteq l$, it need not be that A is k -sealed. good behavior limited to the **image** of $\llbracket - \rrbracket$, *contra* the principles of den.sem.

» critique of relational semantics of TINI

there are several problems with the relational semantics.
refer to $A \in \mathcal{DC}$ as *l-sealed* when $A \cong T_l A$.

1. **failure of antitonicity:** if A is l -sealed and $k \sqsubseteq l$, it need not be that A is k -sealed. good behavior limited to the **image** of $\llbracket - \rrbracket$, *contra* the principles of den.sem.
2. **failure of transitivity:** we think of $x R_{A,l} y$ as meaning “ x indistinguishable to y by clients at level l ”, but $R_{A_\perp,l}$ in TINI model is not transitive!

» critique of relational semantics of TINI

there are several problems with the relational semantics.
refer to $A \in \mathcal{DC}$ as *l-sealed* when $A \cong T_l A$.

1. **failure of antitonicity:** if A is l -sealed and $k \sqsubseteq l$, it need not be that A is k -sealed. good behavior limited to the **image** of $\llbracket - \rrbracket$, *contra* the principles of den.sem.
2. **failure of transitivity:** we think of $x R_{A,l} y$ as meaning “ x indistinguishable to y by clients at level l ”, but $R_{A_\perp, l}$ in TINI model is not transitive!
3. **(TI)NI is bolted on:** relational model takes an **insecure** computational model and **cuts it down** to its secure part. **not what I would call den.sem. for security!**

(end of background)

» intrinsic semantics of termination-insensitive noninterference

our desiderata for semantics:

1. **antitone:** if A is l -sealed and $k \sqsubseteq l$, then A is k -sealed.
2. **intrinsic:** rather than “cutting down” insecure dcpo model, find **new kind of domain** that supports security.

» intrinsic semantics of termination-insensitive noninterference

our desiderata for semantics:

1. **antitone**: if A is l -sealed and $k \sqsubseteq l$, then A is k -sealed.
2. **intrinsic**: rather than “cutting down” insecure dcpo model, find **new kind of domain** that supports security.

these principles naturally lead to (pre)**sheaves of dcpos**, where TINI behavior arises *automatically* in a **startling** way.

» indexed cbpv decomposition of DCC

we simplify our project by decomposing DCC into *value types* and *computation types*.

$A^+ ::= \mathbf{U}X^\ominus \mid \mathbf{bool} \mid \dots$ (value types)

$X^\ominus ::= \mathbf{F}A^+ \mid A^+ \rightarrow X^\ominus \mid \dots$ (comp. types)

» indexed cbpv decomposition of DCC

we simplify our project by decomposing DCC into *value types* and *computation types*.

$$A^+ ::= UX^\ominus \mid \text{bool} \mid \dots \quad (\text{value types})$$

$$X^\ominus ::= FA^+ \mid A^+ \rightarrow X^\ominus \mid \dots \quad (\text{comp. types})$$

close only value types under sealing modalities:

$$A^+ ::= \dots \mid \mathbf{T}_l A^+ \mid \dots$$

» indexed cbpv decomposition of DCC

we simplify our project by decomposing DCC into *value types* and *computation types*.

$$A^+ ::= UX^\ominus \mid \text{bool} \mid \dots \quad (\text{value types})$$

$$X^\ominus ::= FA^+ \mid A^+ \rightarrow X^\ominus \mid \dots \quad (\text{comp. types})$$

close only value types under sealing modalities:

$$A^+ ::= \dots \mid \mathbf{T}_l A^+ \mid \dots$$

index equational theory by security levels $l \in \mathcal{L}$:

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash_l U : A^+}$$

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash_l U \equiv V : A^+}$$

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash_l M : X^\ominus}$$

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash_l M \equiv N : X^\ominus}$$

» the sealing modality; declassification of termination channels

our sealing modality \mathbb{T}_l is an idempotent monad like Abadi et al. (1999). **but it collapses to a point under l :**

$$\frac{k \sqsubseteq l}{\Gamma \vdash_k \star : \mathbb{T}_l A^+}$$

$$\frac{k \sqsubseteq l \quad \Gamma \vdash_k U : \mathbb{T}_l A^+}{\Gamma \vdash_k U \equiv V : \mathbb{T}_l A^+}$$

» the sealing modality; declassification of termination channels

our sealing modality T_l is an idempotent monad like Abadi et al. (1999). **but it collapses to a point under l :**

$$\frac{k \sqsubseteq l}{\Gamma \vdash_k \star : \mathsf{T}_l A^+} \qquad \frac{k \sqsubseteq l \quad \Gamma \vdash_k U : \mathsf{T}_l A^+}{\Gamma \vdash_k U \equiv V : \mathsf{T}_l A^+}$$

for TINI, we add an explicit operation to declassify **side effects** while protecting return values:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_k V : \mathsf{T}_l \mathsf{UFA}^+ \quad A^+ \text{ sealed } @ l}{\Gamma \vdash_k \text{tdcl}_l V : \mathsf{FA}^+}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash_k \text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l(\text{ret } V)) \equiv \text{ret } V}$$

» denotational semantics: total fragment

let \mathcal{L} be a meet semilattice and consider the **presheaf topos**
 $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L} = [\mathcal{L}^{\text{op}}, \text{Set}]$.

» denotational semantics: total fragment

let \mathcal{L} be a meet semilattice and consider the **presheaf topos**
 $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L} = [\mathcal{L}^{\text{op}}, \text{Set}]$.

each security level $l \in \mathcal{L}$ gives rise to a **proposition** $\langle l \rangle$ in the
internal language of $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$:

$$\langle l \rangle k = (k \leq l)$$

» denotational semantics: total fragment

let \mathcal{L} be a meet semilattice and consider the **presheaf topos**
 $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L} = [\mathcal{L}^{\text{op}}, \text{Set}]$.

each security level $l \in \mathcal{L}$ gives rise to a **proposition** $\langle l \rangle$ in the
internal language of $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$:

$$\langle l \rangle k = (k \leq l)$$

intuitive meaning of $\langle l \rangle$ is “**I am unauthorized to see l** ”.
we will interpret the sealing modality as **redaction**.

» security levels induce phase distinctions

$\langle l \rangle$ gives rise to two reflective subcategories:

1. the presheaves A such that $A \cong A^{\langle l \rangle}$ are $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent
2. the presheaves A such that $A \times \langle l \rangle \cong \langle l \rangle$ are $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed

to *seal* a presheaf A , we take a pushout (quotient of sum):

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \langle l \rangle \times A & \xrightarrow{\pi_1} & \langle l \rangle \\
 \pi_2 \downarrow & & \downarrow \star \\
 A & \xrightarrow[\eta_l]{\quad} & \langle l \rangle \bullet A
 \end{array}$$

$$\langle l \rangle \bullet A \cong (\langle l \rangle + A) / \sim$$


where

$$u \sim v \iff (\langle l \rangle = \top) \vee (u = v)$$

we will interpret $\llbracket \top_l A^+ \rrbracket := \langle l \rangle \bullet \llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$.

» visualizing the sealing modality

let $\mathcal{L} = \{L \sqsubset M \sqsubset H \sqsubset T\}$, and fix $A \in \text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$.



» noninterference for total maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, noninterference for *total* maps is **immediate**:

Theorem

if A is $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed and B is $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent, then any function $A \rightarrow B$ is constant.

» noninterference for total maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, noninterference for *total* maps is **immediate**:

Theorem

if A is $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed and B is $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent, then any function $A \rightarrow B$ is constant.

Corollary

any function $\langle l \rangle \bullet \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow 2$ is constant.

that's because 2 is constant and thus $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent.

» noninterference for total maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, noninterference for *total* maps is **immediate**:

Theorem

if A is $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed and B is $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent, then any function $A \rightarrow B$ is constant.

Corollary

any function $\langle l \rangle \bullet \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow 2$ is constant.

that's because 2 is constant and thus $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent.

leads to TINI, as *partial functions* $A \multimap B$ are encoded by total functions $A \rightarrow \sum_{\phi: \text{Prop}} B^\phi$ which is **not** constant.

$$\text{Prop}(l) = \{\phi \subseteq \mathcal{L} \downarrow l \mid \phi \text{ closed under precomposition}\}$$

» termination-insensitive noninterference for partial maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, a *partial map* $A \multimap B$ is given by a total map $A \rightarrow \text{LB}$ into the **partial map classifier**:

$$\text{LB} := \sum_{\phi:\text{Prop}} B^\phi$$

» termination-insensitive noninterference for partial maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, a *partial map* $A \multimap B$ is given by a total map $A \rightarrow \text{LB}$ into the **partial map classifier**:

$$\text{LB} := \sum_{\phi:\text{Prop}} B^\phi$$

Theorem (termination-insensitive noninterference)

for any function $f : \langle l \rangle \bullet \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \text{L2}$, if $fx \downarrow$ and $fy \downarrow$ then $fx = fy$.

» termination-insensitive noninterference for partial maps

in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, a *partial map* $A \multimap B$ is given by a total map $A \rightarrow \text{LB}$ into the **partial map classifier**:

$$\text{LB} := \sum_{\phi:\text{Prop}} B^\phi$$

Theorem (termination-insensitive noninterference)

for any function $f : \langle l \rangle \bullet \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \text{L2}$, if $fx \downarrow$ and $fy \downarrow$ then $fx = fy$.

Proof.

the partial function f restricts to a total function $\tilde{f} : U \rightarrow 2$ where $U \subseteq \langle l \rangle \bullet \mathbb{Z}$ is the set of values on which f is defined; but 2 is $\langle l \rangle$ -transparent. \square

» internal domain theory for recursion

the TINI property is observed already for partial maps between presheaves, but we need to interpret recursion.

idea: replace ordinary dcpos with *internal* dcpos in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$!

» internal domain theory for recursion

the TINI property is observed already for partial maps between presheaves, but we need to interpret recursion.

idea: replace ordinary dcpos with *internal* dcpos in $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$!

partial map classifier extends to a *lifting monad* on dcpos:

$$u \leq_{LA} v \iff \forall x : A.u = (\top, a) \implies \exists y : A.v = (\top, b) \wedge x \leq_A y$$

» Eilenberg–Moore model of cbpv DCC

1. A^+ is interpreted as an **internal dcpo** $\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$ in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$;
2. X^\ominus is interpreted as an **algebra** for L in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$.

$$\llbracket \mathbf{U}X^\ominus \rrbracket = \llbracket X \rrbracket \quad \llbracket \mathbf{F}A^+ \rrbracket = L\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$$

» Eilenberg–Moore model of cbpv DCC

1. A^+ is interpreted as an **internal dcpo** $\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$ in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$;
2. X^\ominus is interpreted as an **algebra** for L in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$.

$$\llbracket \mathbf{U}X^\ominus \rrbracket = \llbracket X \rrbracket \quad \llbracket \mathbf{F}A^+ \rrbracket = L\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$$

$\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$ is cocomplete over $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, so we can interpret $\llbracket \mathbf{T}_l A^+ \rrbracket$ as the pushout $\langle l \rangle \bullet \llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$.

» Eilenberg–Moore model of cbpv DCC

1. A^+ is interpreted as an **internal dcpo** $\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$ in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$;
2. X^\ominus is interpreted as an **algebra** for L in $\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$.

$$\llbracket \mathbf{U}X^\ominus \rrbracket = \llbracket X \rrbracket \quad \llbracket \mathbf{F}A^+ \rrbracket = L\llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$$

$\text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$ is cocomplete over $\text{Pr } \mathcal{L}$, so we can interpret $\llbracket \mathbf{T}_l A^+ \rrbracket$ as the pushout $\langle l \rangle \bullet \llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$.

$\llbracket \Gamma \vdash_l V : A^+ \rrbracket$ is a continuous map $\llbracket V \rrbracket : \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket \times \langle l \rangle \rightarrow \llbracket A^+ \rrbracket$.

» interpretation of termination declassification

for any $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed $A \in \text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$, we must construct a continuous map $\text{tdcl}_l : \langle l \rangle \bullet LA \rightarrow LA$. use universal property of the pushout!

$$\begin{aligned}\text{tdcl}_l(\star) &= (\top, \star) \\ \text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l(\phi, a)) &= (\langle l \rangle \vee \phi, [\langle l \rangle \hookrightarrow \star, \phi \hookrightarrow a])\end{aligned}$$

» interpretation of termination declassification

for any $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed $A \in \text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$, we must construct a continuous map $\text{tdcl}_l : \langle l \rangle \bullet LA \rightarrow LA$. use universal property of the pushout!

$$\begin{aligned}\text{tdcl}_l(\star) &= (\top, \star) \\ \text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l(\phi, a)) &= (\langle l \rangle \vee \phi, [\langle l \rangle \hookrightarrow \star, \phi \hookrightarrow a])\end{aligned}$$

computationally, each $\langle l \rangle \in \text{Prop} \cong \text{L1}$ can be thought of as an **assertion** that l is redacted from the observer.

» interpretation of termination declassification

for any $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed $A \in \text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$, we must construct a continuous map $\text{tdcl}_l : \langle l \rangle \bullet LA \rightarrow LA$. use universal property of the pushout!

$$\begin{aligned}\text{tdcl}_l(\star) &= (\top, \star) \\ \text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l(\phi, a)) &= (\langle l \rangle \vee \phi, [\langle l \rangle \hookrightarrow \star, \phi \hookrightarrow a])\end{aligned}$$

computationally, each $\langle l \rangle \in \text{Prop} \cong \text{L1}$ can be thought of as an **assertion** that l is redacted from the observer.

termination declassification runs this assertion **in parallel** with the sealed computation.

» interpretation of termination declassification

for any $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\langle l \rangle$ -sealed $A \in \text{dcpo}(\text{Pr } \mathcal{L})$, we must construct a continuous map $\text{tdcl}_l : \langle l \rangle \bullet LA \rightarrow LA$. use universal property of the pushout!

$$\begin{aligned}\text{tdcl}_l(\star) &= (\top, \star) \\ \text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l(\phi, a)) &= (\langle l \rangle \vee \phi, [\langle l \rangle \hookrightarrow \star, \phi \hookrightarrow a])\end{aligned}$$

computationally, each $\langle l \rangle \in \text{Prop} \cong \text{L1}$ can be thought of as an **assertion** that l is redacted from the observer.

termination declassification runs this assertion **in parallel** with the sealed computation.

thus for an observer **away from** (above) $\langle l \rangle$, the divergence of $\text{tdcl}_l(\eta_l \perp)$ is visible.

» adequacy and TINI for cbpv dcc

we prove **adequacy** of the equational theory for the presheaf model using a Plotkin–style logical relations argument via **synthetic Tait computability** (Sterling and Harper, 2021a; Sterling, 2021).

thus TINI lifts from the model to the equational theory.

» an example of a program with a leaky termination channel

Example

there exists an l -sealed type A^+ and a function $M : A^+ \rightarrow \text{UFunit}$ such that for some closed terms $U, V : A^+$ we have $MU \Downarrow$ but $MV \Uparrow$.

Proof.

Choose the following:

$$A^+ := \mathsf{T}_l \text{bool}$$

$$U := \eta_l \text{ true}$$

$$V := \eta_l \text{ false}$$

$$M := \lambda x. \text{tdcl}_l(z \leftarrow x; \eta_l(\text{if } z \text{ then ret } () \text{ else } \perp)) \square$$

» overview of contributions

we have contributed an **intrinsic** and **non-relational** denotational semantics for TINI.

- * real den.sem.: good behavior outside $\text{im} \llbracket - \rrbracket$.
- * avoids transitivity issue: **no relations, no problem!**
- * ordinary / **naïve** Scott semantics, but in **presheaves**.

» overview of contributions

we have contributed an **intrinsic** and **non-relational** denotational semantics for TINI.

- * real den.sem.: good behavior outside $\text{im } \llbracket - \rrbracket$.
- * avoids transitivity issue: **no relations, no problem!**
- * ordinary / **naïve** Scott semantics, but in **presheaves**.

fully **synthetic** methods (not detailed in this talk!):

- * **logical frameworks** for the equational theory,
- * **synthetic domain theory** for the denotational semantics,
- * **synthetic Tait computability** for the adequacy proof.

» references

- M. Abadi, A. Banerjee, N. Heintze, and J. G. Riecke. A core calculus of dependency. In *Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages*, POPL '99, pages 147–160, San Antonio, Texas, USA, 1999. Association for Computing Machinery. ISBN 1-58113-095-3. doi: 10.1145/292540.292555.
- J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Security policies and security models. In *1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 1982. doi: 10.1109/SP.1982.10014.
- R. Harper, J. C. Mitchell, and E. Moggi. Higher-order modules and the phase distinction. In *Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages*, pages 341–354, San Francisco, California, USA, 1990. Association for Computing Machinery. ISBN 0-89791-343-4. doi: 10.1145/96709.96744.

» references (cont.)

- Y. Niu, J. Sterling, H. Grodin, and R. Harper. A cost-aware logical framework. *Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages*, 6(POPL), Jan. 2022. doi: 10.1145/3498670.
- J. C. Reynolds. Types, abstraction, and parametric polymorphism. In *Information Processing*, 1983.
- J. Sterling. *First Steps in Synthetic Tait Computability: The Objective Metatheory of Cubical Type Theory*. PhD thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 2021. CMU technical report CMU-CS-21-142.
- J. Sterling and R. Harper. Logical relations as types: Proof-relevant parametricity for program modules. *Journal of the ACM*, 68(6), Oct. 2021a. ISSN 0004-5411. doi: 10.1145/3474834.

» references (cont.)

- J. Sterling and R. Harper. A metalanguage for multi-phase modularity. ML 2021 abstract and talk, Aug. 2021b. URL <https://icfp21.sigplan.org/details/mlfamilyworkshop-2021-papers/5/A-metalanguage-for-multi-phase-modularity>.
- J. Sterling and R. Harper. Sheaf semantics of termination-insensitive noninterference. In A. Felty, editor, *7th International Conference on Formal Structures for Computation and Deduction (FSCD 2022)*, volume 228 of *Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)*, Dagstuhl, Germany, Aug. 2022. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz–Zentrum fuer Informatik. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSCD.2022.15.